There was only a small selection of games, including an OK port of the arcade hit Virtua Fighter, with few new titles expected until later in the year. The machines were expensive and in short supply only a handful of major retailers got them, alienating the rest of the market. “We’ve decided to bring the product to market earlier than scheduled to meet the high consumer demand, to refine our marketing strategy over the summer, prior to the important fall season, and to get a head start on the competition.”īut it was a shambles. “Many Americans have gone to the extent of paying $800 and more for Sega Saturn units from Japan,” said Kalinske in the resulting press release. So on 11 May, at the E3 event, Tom Kalinske went on stage and announced that the Saturn was not only launching early in the US, it was already on the shelves – at the basic price of $399. Nakayama believed that Sega had to get into the US market early and establish a presence before Sony. Sega had an autumn US release for the Saturn all planned out its production line was in motion, retailers were ready. And, although the Saturn was selling well in Japan, shifting almost 500,000 units in its first month, PlayStation was catching up. The 32X was an expensive failure with little software support. But this muddied the waters for the Saturn. He wanted a quick stop-gap to rival the Atari system (which would go on to flop hopelessly) and the US team agreed. The 32X, a semi-32-bit add-on for the old console, was engendered almost entirely by the US R&D team – in fact, the original concept was designed by lead engineers Joe Miller and Marty Franz, who hastily jotted down the idea for a basic 32-bit system on a piece of hotel notepaper while attending the Consumer Electronics show in 1994.Ī typically gritty and mature image from Sony’s early console advertising, bearing the slogan, ‘Do not underestimate the power of PlayStation.’ Photograph: public domainīut the order to go ahead with this curious hybrid came from Sega of Japan president Hayao Nakayama who – as incredible as it may seem today – was concerned not about the looming PlayStation, but about Atari’s Jaguar console. However, the company had to be much more cautious about the US, where it wanted to protect and enhance the huge market share it had torn away from Nintendo. The Japanese office was encouraged to head straight into Saturn development after the launch of the Mega Drive because the machine hadn’t been a huge success in the domestic market. What the divisions faced was a huge challenge in appeasing two very different markets. There were also rumours of a rift between Sega of Japan and Sega of America although it was never quite as simple – or juicy – as that. Sony had one product and one message: PlayStation is the future. Sega meanwhile, had been confusing and alienating its audience and development community with a string of add-ons for the hugely successful (but increasingly dated) Mega Drive, and a wealth of promises about new hardware platforms that never materialised. The company’s chief system designer, Ken Kutaragi, visited developers all over the world, bringing an impressive set of graphics demos (including the famed dinosaur 3D model) and promising a wealth of cool development tools and favourable production deals. Sony had spent 1994 on a global charm offensive.
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